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Fair Use in Trademark in the
Post-KP Permanent World
HOW INCORPORATING PRINCIPLES FROM
COPYRIGHT LAW WILL LEAD TO LESS CONFUSION
IN TRADEMARK LAW
INTRODUCTION
Imagine it is Christmas time, and you are looking for a
gift for your nine-year-old niece Suzie. You know that Suzie
loves the television show, American Idol, 1 so you resort to the
Internet and perform a search for the phrase “American Idol.”
This search brings you to the homepage of Constantine
Maroulis, a former contestant from the show’s past season.
The top of the page reads, “Welcome to the homepage of
Constantine Maroulis: A Real American Idol.” The page
contains many references to the television show, including
screenshots of a few of Constantine’s more memorable
performances. You can even purchase Constantine’s debut CD,
entitled “A Real American Idol,” as well as a life-size
Constantine Maroulis poster if you are so inclined. Suzie is a
big fan, so you buy both, but when you give them to her, she
starts crying. Suzie screams, “That’s not the real American
Idol! Where’s Kelly Clarkson, Ruben Studdard, and Fantasia
Barrino?” 2
Failed Christmas presents aside, American Idol has a
potential claim for trademark infringement against
Constantine Maroulis, since consumers may incorrectly think
that the show produced or sponsored Constantine’s CD.
Trademarks are designed to protect the trade reputation, or
goodwill, of the trademark owner who, through use and
advertising, has created an association of his or her product or
1

American Idol (FOX television broadcast 2002-present).
Kelly Clarkson, Ruben Studdard, and Fantasia Barrino were the winners
from the first three seasons. As winners, American Idol produces and releases their
debut album.
For more information, see American Idol: About the Show,
http://www.idolonfox.com/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).
2
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service with that trademark. 3 For a trademark owner to
succeed on a claim of infringement under the Federal
Trademark (Lanham) Act, 4 he must show that consumers are
likely to be confused as to the source of the junior user’s
product. 5 Courts typically look at many factors to determine if
a likelihood of confusion exists. 6
On the other hand, Constantine has a good opportunity
to assert the statutory fair use defense to trademark
infringement, since he is simply describing himself as a real
American idol, and to some, this is an accurate description. In
defense to a charge of trademark infringement, a defendant can
assert the statutory fair use defense of the Lanham Act. 7 To
succeed on this defense, a defendant must show that he used
the trademark descriptively, not as a trademark, fairly, and in
good faith. 8 Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had not
addressed how courts should handle the fair use defense when
faced with a seemingly strong claim for trademark
infringement. In other words, can Constantine claim that his
use was fair even though consumers are likely to be confused
by the origin of the products sold on his website?
In 2004, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision
addressing the issue. 9 In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc. (“KP Permanent”), the Supreme
Court held that the statutory fair use defense could succeed
even in the face of confusion. 10 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court failed to give any indication as to just how much
confusion could defeat the fair use defense. 11 In this Note, I
will argue that because of the similarities between the concerns
of copyright and trademark protection, trademark law will
benefit from incorporating some of the factors from copyright
law’s fair use defense as an aid to lower courts being asked to
decide whether a use is fair. Although copyright law differs
3

See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:2 (4th ed., 2005).
4
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000).
5
Id. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
6
See infra note 32.
7
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
8
Id.
9
See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111 (2004).
10
Id. at 122 (holding that “some possibility of consumer confusion must be
compatible with fair use”).
11
Id. at 123 (recognizing that while “mere risk of confusion will not rule out
fair use, we think it would be improvident to go further in this case”).
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from trademark law in that it protects original works of
authorship such as songs or books, there are substantial
similarities between the two that justify incorporation. 12
In trademark law prior to KP Permanent, the circuit
courts disagreed on the role that confusion played in a fair use
defense. 13 The Ninth Circuit, which issued the decision leading
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in KP Permanent, allowed
confusion to defeat a fair use defense and required the
defendant to prove the absence of likely confusion. 14 In
opposition to that view, the Second Circuit allowed fair use to
succeed even upon a showing of some confusion and did not
require a defendant to negate any likelihood of confusion. 15
Other courts fell somewhere in the middle. 16 In KP Permanent,
the Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit, holding
that fair use could exist in the face of confusion, but left open to
interpretation just how much confusion would defeat a fair use
defense. 17 The Court’s decision effectively left lower courts with
a blank check, and those courts have not balked at the ability
to write their own rules. 18
Copyright law’s fair use test has given lower courts the
clear guidance lacking in trademark law, and similar principles
and factors from that test are inherent in trademark law. 19 In
copyright law, it is well established that fair use is an
affirmative defense to infringement. 20 After decades of judge12

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
14
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061,
1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
15
See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co.,
125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that any confusion that results “is a risk the
plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with a mark that uses a well
known descriptive phrase”) (citing Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70
F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995)).
16
See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a “likelihood of confusion forecloses a fair use defense”);
Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing
that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense); but cf. Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he fair use
defense comes into play only when infringement – including a likelihood of confusion –
has been established”); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055,
1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that fair use could succeed even in the face of likely
confusion).
17
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
116-17 (2004).
18
See discussion infra Part I.E.
19
See discussion infra Part III.
20
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also discussion infra Part II.
13
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made law, 21 Congress codified the doctrine in section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. 22 Section 107 defined four factors that
courts should look at to determine if an alleged infringing use
is fair. 23 These factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the
use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use
on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 24
While there is no per se formula for what constitutes fair use,
certain combinations of these factors will make a fair use
defense more likely to succeed. 25
Some judges have already begun to implicitly apply
This Note will
copyright concepts to trademark cases. 26
demonstrate why these judges are moving in the right direction
and suggest further ways to implement this new approach.
Part I begins with a history of fair use in trademark, including
the circuit split that led to the decision in KP Permanent. This
section will also address the Court’s holding in KP Permanent
and illustrate the Court’s reasoning for establishing fair use as
an absolute defense. This section will conclude by discussing
the state of the fair use defense following KP Permanent and
the ways in which lower courts have begun to apply the
Supreme Court’s holding.
Part II will discuss the background of fair use in
copyright, and the factors that courts apply to determine fair
use. This section will also illustrate typical applications of the
copyright fair use test and instances in which courts have
upheld or denied use as fair. Part III will look at the
similarities between the principles of trademark and copyright
protection as well as their respective fair use defenses. In
order to suggest that trademark law should incorporate
elements of copyright law, this section will illustrate the
similar concerns of both areas of the law in granting protection
21

The concept of fair use in copyright first appeared in a judicial opinion in
1841. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). The
term “fair use” in copyright first appeared in a judicial opinion in 1869. See Lawrence
v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
22
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1096
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fair use defense failed even though the fourth factor favored the
defendant); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (while
suggesting fair use on the first three factors, the Court remanded to allow the hole in
the evidence with respect to the fourth factor to “be plugged on remand”).
26
See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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and allowing fair use. This section will also address the notion
that the scope of trademarks is expanding, which warrants a
further examination of their protection.
Finally, Part IV will argue that trademark law can
borrow specific principles from copyright law to lead to less
confusion in the lower courts. This section will demonstrate
how borrowing certain aspects of the copyright test and
incorporating them into their counterparts in trademark will
provide courts with a more consistent approach to fair use in
trademark and ultimately lead to less confusion in litigation.
I.

TRADEMARKS AND FAIR USE

A trademark is a designation that identifies and
distinguishes a seller’s goods from those of its competitors. 27
By attaching a trademark to its goods, a seller alerts the public
that goods bearing this trademark come from that seller and
are of a certain quality. 28 For example, when a consumer sees a
small insignia of a polo player on a horse on the breast of a
man’s shirt, he knows that shirt was manufactured by Polo, 29
and this brand alerts the buyer to a level of quality in the shirt.
Trademarks are granted legal protection to safeguard this
trade reputation of the trademark owner who has created an
association of a product or service with that trademark. 30
When someone other than the trademark owner begins selling
goods using a similar name, the trademark owner may succeed
on a claim of infringement by showing that consumers are
likely to be confused by the similarities. 31 In these cases, courts
conduct an intense fact-finding inquiry to determine if a
likelihood of confusion exists. 32

27

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:1.
Id. § 3:2.
29
Polo is a popular brand of clothing, best known for its logo consisting of a
horse which often appears on the breast of a man’s collared shirt. For more
information, see About Ralph Lauren, http://about.polo.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).
30
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2.
31
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
32
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (defining the factors to consider as: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s trademark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products or
services; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6)
a defendant’s bad faith in adopting its mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product;
and (8) the sophistication of the buyers).
28
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Statutory, or “Classic,” Fair Use

In defense to a charge of trademark infringement, a
defendant can assert the statutory fair use defense of the
Lanham Act. 33 To succeed on this defense, a defendant must
show that he used the trademark descriptively and not as a
For example, a
trademark, fairly, and in good faith. 34
housecleaning service who advertises that they will “Clean up
your Windows” can assert the statutory fair use defense if faced
with allegations of infringement by Microsoft. 35 Statutory fair
use is also referred to as “classic” fair use, since it existed
under the common law of unfair competition prior to the
enactment of the Lanham Act. 36 In passing the Lanham Act,
Congress codified the doctrine and established that a user
accused of infringement can assert the statutory affirmative
defense of fair use. 37 The fair use defense, in essence, restricts
a trademark owner from exercising exclusive rights over a
descriptive term which would prevent others from accurately
Specifically, the Lanham Act
describing their product. 38
requires that three elements be met to establish the defense:
(1) the challenged infringement must not be used as a trade or
service mark; (2) the challenged infringement must describe
the goods; and (3) use must be fair and in good faith. 39 While
the first two factors involve relatively simple factual inquiries,

33
34

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
The relevant portion of 15 U.S.C. § 1115 provides:

That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of
a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe to users the goods or services of such party, or their geographic
origin . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
35
Microsoft is a corporation which manufactures computer hardware and
software, most notably, the Windows operating system. For more information, see
Microsoft Corporation homepage, http://www.microsoft.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
36
See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528
(1924) (stating that “[t]he use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his
own product does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the
public to mistake the origin or ownership of the product”).
37
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
38
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980)
(permitting fair use “forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term
for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic
of their goods”).
39
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
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the final factor implicates much more subjective analysis, and
courts have come to strikingly different conclusions on what
constitutes fair use. 40
Before a defendant can assert statutory fair use as a
defense to an infringement claim, the plaintiff must first show
that its trademark is valid and that defendant’s use of the
trademark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception
among consumers as to the source of defendant’s goods or
services. 41 Once a plaintiff has established both of these
elements, a defendant may claim that his or her use is fair as
an affirmative defense. 42 In permitting fair use of trademarks,
the Lanham Act seeks to prohibit a trademark owner from
precluding others from describing their goods. 43
By choosing a potentially descriptive mark, a plaintiff
runs a significant risk, because a competitor may want to use
those same words to accurately describe his or her product. 44
For example, although Tasti-D-Lite is a registered trademark,
a competing ice cream shop may wish to advertise that its ice
cream is tasty and delightful. Generally, the law prefers to
avoid monopolies, but trademark law often grants exclusive
rights, because there is a seemingly endless supply of potential
trademarks, and the cost of the monopoly to society is seen as
insignificant. 45 In other words, in the Tasti-D-Lite example, a
40
Compare PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a “likelihood of confusion forecloses a fair use defense”);
Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing
that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense) with Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he fair use
defense comes into play only when infringement – including a likelihood of confusion –
has been established”); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055,
1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that fair use could succeed even in the face of likely
confusion).
41
See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir.
2000) (stating that “[t]o prevail on [a claim of] trademark infringement [a plaintiff
must] prove that [its trademark] is a protectable trademark and that [defendant’s use]
is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of sponsorship of [plaintiff’s] product”).
42
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
43
U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (allowing fair use “to prevent the trademark rights of one party from being
extended to preclude another party from the description of his product to the public”
(citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 477, 486 (1983))), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1990). A plaintiff choosing a descriptive mark “cannot altogether exclude some
kinds of competing uses.” Id.
44
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir.
1976).
45
U.S. Shoe Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 198 (stating that trademark law permits
monopolies “because potential identifying marks exist in virtually inexhaustible supply
[and] the cost of the monopoly to society is minimal”).
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competitor should have no problem using words other than
“tasty” or “delightful” to convey the same message without
causing unnecessary confusion in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, since the cost to society increases if a trademark
owner is granted exclusive use of a descriptive trademark, fair
use exists in part to help balance the interests in trademark
protection and unfair competition. 46 Unfortunately, statutory
fair use leaves open the question: at what point is the cost of
confusion created by fair use too great for society to tolerate?
When a defendant uses another’s trademark in the nondescriptive sense, however, he may still avoid a claim of
infringement if his use falls under the nominative fair use
doctrine.
B.

Nominative Fair Use

While statutory fair use allows a defendant to use a
trademark to describe its own product or service descriptively,
nominative fair use allows a defendant to use a trademark to
describe the trademark owner’s product or service. 47 For
example, an advertising campaign for “Brand X” that claims “If
you like Brand Y, you’ll love Brand X” is an example of a
nominative fair use. The nominative fair use defense is
entirely a product of the judiciary. 48 The leading court in
addressing nominative fair use, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, defined three elements required to successfully assert
a nominative fair use claim: (1) “the product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the
trademark;” (2) “only so much of the mark or marks may be
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service;” and (3) “the user must do nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.” 49 For example, when
former Playboy Playmate of the Year, Terri Welles, used the
words “Playmate of the Year” to describe herself on her
website, the court upheld the use as fair under the nominative
fair use doctrine, because the words sought only “to identify
46

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:45 (discussing the distinctions
between statutory and nominative fair use).
48
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
49
Id.
47
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Welles as a past . . . ‘Playmate of the Year’” and not to
“imply . . . current sponsorship or endorsement by [Playboy].” 50
Nominative fair use appears in many different forms.
In addition to the referential use in the Terri Welles case and
the comparative advertising in the “Brand X” example,
nominative fair use also arises in promotional use and parody.
An example of promotional use includes the sale of a t-shirt by
a third party bearing a trademark such as a sports team.
Danish band Aqua’s infamous song entitled Barbie Girl is a
good example of parody. 51 Courts have often wrestled with how
to handle nominative fair use claims, particularly in the area of
In parody, courts have
parody and promotional use. 52
consistently agreed that, in order to be successful, a parody
must convey two conflicting messages: that it actually is the
original, but also that it is not the original but rather a
parody. 53 This creates an obvious conflict in policy, because the
more successful the parody, the more confused a consumer will
be at first glance. Therefore, nominative fair use raises similar
problems as that of statutory fair use in that courts must
create their own rules to determine how confusion relates to
the fair use defense. The questionable relationship between
confusion and the fair use defense created a division of
interpretations amongst the circuit courts. 54
C.

The Lead-Up to KP Permanent

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent,
the circuit courts disagreed on the significance of likely

50

Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800-02 (9th Cir. 2002).
AQUA, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997).
52
In the promotional use line of cases, there are clearly two schools of
thought. One approach finds infringement even when no confusion as to source exists.
See Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th
Cir. 1975) (holding that patches sold by a sporting goods store bearing the insignia of a
professional sports team constituted infringement even though consumers purchased
the patches to show allegiance and not because of their source). The other approach to
promotional use assesses whether consumers view the use of the trademark as a source
identifier to determine whether confusion exists. See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that jewelry bearing the
trademark of a young women’s fraternal organization did not constitute infringement
because purchasers did not see the trademark as identifying source). Parody is equally
conflicting.
53
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989). (noting that “[c]onflict between . . . policies is inevitable in the
context of parody, because the keystone of parody is imitation”).
54
See discussion infra Part I.C.
51
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confusion as it pertains to a fair use defense. 55 The Second
Circuit represented one point of view, holding that fair use is
an absolute defense to infringement regardless of the confusion
that results. 56 The Ninth Circuit required a defendant to prove
the absence of confusion and found that a failure to do so
diminished the likelihood of a fair use claim to prevail. 57
Amongst the other circuits, both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
held that any likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense, 58
while the Fourth and Seventh Circuits held that fair use could
succeed even in the face of likely confusion. 59 Under the Ninth
Circuit’s approach, the owner of an ice cream shop who
advertises that his ice cream is “tasty” cannot succeed on a fair
use defense against Tasti-D-Lite unless he or she proves that
consumers do not confuse his goods with those from Tasti-DLite. In the Second Circuit, the fair use defense could succeed
in this example even if Tasti-D-Lite were able to prove that
nearly all ice cream consumers were confused by the other
store’s advertisement. Regardless of the circuits’ conflicting
interpretations of the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act,
the statute gives no indication as to how much confusion is too
much. 60 The Supreme Court had yet to address this issue
either. In fact, the significance of confusion in a fair use
defense provided the Court with its justification for granting
certiorari. 61
55

The views of the Ninth and Second Circuits lay at the heart of the circuit
split. The Ninth Circuit represented the view that any confusion would defeat a
statutory fair use defense. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004). The Second
Circuit opposed this view, finding that fair use is a defense to liability even if there is a
likelihood of confusion. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s
USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1977). Although the circuit split that led to KP
Permanent did not involve nominative fair use claims, courts have shown equal
disagreement with the relationship of confusion in the nominative fair use context. See
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
56
Cosmetically Sealed, 125 F.3d at 30 (holding that any resulting confusion
from alleged infringement is inherent in the risk that plaintiff took in selecting the
descriptive term, and therefore, does not bar the fair use defense).
57
KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072.
58
See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th
Cir. 2003); Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
59
See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir.
1997); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir.
1995).
60
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
61
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
116 (2004) (granting certiorari “to address a disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals on the significance of likely confusion for a fair use defense to a trademark
infringement claim”).
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In the months before the Court’s decision, scholars
speculated about how the Court would rule, and the
implications different rulings would create. 62 Most thought
that the Court would side with the Second Circuit’s approach
in allowing confusion to exist in a fair use defense. 63 Others
foresaw the danger a ruling siding with the Ninth Circuit could
create. 64 As one scholar noted, by affirming the Ninth Circuit’s
holding, “[s]ummary judgment would rarely be granted when a
fair use defense is asserted because the defendant would have
to disprove likelihood of confusion – a fact-intensive inquiry
that is typically part of the plaintiff’s case.” 65 This could either
preclude summary judgment altogether or defeat its purpose in
avoiding the fact-intensive inquiries of litigation when a
defendant asserts fair use. 66
D.

The KP Permanent Case
1. Background and Procedural History

With the legal landscape ripe for change, the basis for
KP Permanent arose as follows. Petitioner KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. (“KP”) and Respondent Lasting Impression I,
Inc. (“Lasting Impression”) both manufactured and sold
permanent makeup, “a mixture of pigment and liquid for
injection under the skin to camouflage injuries and modify
nature’s dispensations,” and in doing so, both used the term
“microcolor” in marketing their products. 67 In 1992, Lasting
Impression federally registered a trademark with the words

62
See generally Lynda M. Braun, Fair Is Fair, But Is It Enough?, 4 IP LAW &
BUS. 54 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 208-10 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, The
Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1659, 1697-1700 (2004).
63
See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 208 (predicting that “the Court will
find that the availability of a fair use defense is not conditioned on there being no
likelihood of confusion”).
64
See, e.g., Braun, supra note 62 (speculating on the dangers of affirming the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion).
65
Id.
66
To disprove confusion, a defendant “would have to conduct a survey and/or
go to trial to prove an absence of likelihood of confusion.” Id. This would create suits
that are “longer and more costly.” Id.
67
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
114 (2004). The Court noted that both used the term “as one word or two, singular or
plural.” Id.
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“Micro Colors” written in a small graphic. 68 KP, however,
continued to use the word “microcolor” to describe its goods,
and, in response to a ten-page advertising brochure put out by
KP in 1999, Lasting Impression requested that KP discontinue
its use of the term. 69 This led to a lawsuit in which Lasting
Impression alleged trademark infringement, among other
claims, and KP asserted the statutory fair use defense. 70 The
district court granted KP’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that KP’s use of “microcolors” was fair, but declined to
address the question of whether confusion may result. 71 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, criticizing the lower court’s
failure to address the issue of confusion, and remanded to
determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed. 72 The
Ninth Circuit also appeared to place the burden of proof as to
confusion upon KP. 73 The Supreme Court granted KP’s petition
for certiorari to address the disagreement among the circuit
courts on the relevance of likely confusion to a fair use defense
and to determine which party bears the burden in proving
confusion or the absence thereof. 74
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision
Justice Souter delivered the opinion for the unanimous
Supreme Court, holding that the party claiming fair use does
not bear the burden of negating the likelihood of confusion. 75
This did not come as a surprise, since the Ninth Circuit stood
alone in suggesting that the defendant bears that burden. 76 In

68

Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 115.
70
Id.
71
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., No. CV-0000276-GLT (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2001). Author’s note: There is some confusion, no pun
intended, as to the full name of Lasting Impression. While at the circuit court and
Supreme Court levels, they are referred to as “Lasting Impression I, Inc.,” at the
district court level, they are referred to as “Lasting Impression, Inc.”
72
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061,
1072-73 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
73
Id. at 1072 (stating that “KP can only benefit from the fair use defense if
there is no likelihood of confusion between KP’s use of the term ‘micro color’ and
Lasting’s mark”).
74
KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116 (granting certiorari “to address a
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on the significance of likely confusion for a
fair use defense to a trademark infringement claim”).
75
Id. at 112 (noting that the Lanham Act “places a burden of proving
likelihood of confusion (that is, infringement) on the party charging infringement”).
76
KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072.
69
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answering the more important question of the relationship of
confusion to the fair use defense, 77 Justice Souter created,
ironically enough, greater confusion for lower courts addressing
the statutory fair use defense. 78 The Court did make clear that
fair use could prevail in the face of confusion but gave no
guidance as to just how much confusion would defeat the
defense of fair use. 79 In addition, the Court acknowledged that
lower courts may consider likelihood of confusion when
determining whether a use is fair. 80 It is also worth noting that
the Court did not give any indication as to whether its analysis
was applicable to nominative fair use. 81 Given this backdrop,
the Court left open the door for the circuit courts to create their
own balancing tests for determining the success or failure of a
fair use defense when faced with a likelihood of confusion.
E.

Fair Use in the Post-KP Permanent World

In the first year after the Supreme Court’s decision in
KP Permanent, only a few courts have addressed fair use
claims, and these decisions demonstrate the lack of guidance
that the Court’s decision provided for the lower courts. 82 While
courts currently recognize that the plaintiff bears the burden in
proving a likelihood of confusion and that fair use can exist in
the face of confusion, 83 the role that confusion plays in a fair
use defense, particularly in the nominative fair use context, 84
has left courts without direction.
77

KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 120-23.
See discussion infra Part I.E.
79
KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 123 (holding that while “mere risk of confusion
will not rule out fair use, we think it would be improvident to go further in this case”).
80
Id. at 115 n.3 (refusing to address nominative fair use because it is not
“relevant to the question before us”).
81
For one case which discusses the effect of KP Permanent on a nominative
fair use case, see Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d
Cir. 2005). See also discussion infra Part I.E.
82
This note will discuss three cases which provide particularly good
examples of the problems created by the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent.
See discussion infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
83
See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408
F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a defendant raising the fair use defense
“has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion” and that “fair
use can occur along with some degree of confusion”) (quoting KP Permanent, 543 U.S.
at 123-24); New York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinentalexchange, Inc., 389 F.
Supp. 2d 527, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same).
84
See, e.g., Century 21, 425 F.3d at 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (addressing a
nominative fair use claim after KP Permanent and determining “the extent to which its
reasoning applies”).
78
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On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reassessed the merits of KP’s fair use claim but again denied
their motion for summary judgment. 85 Even after the Supreme
Court had vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the lower court
came to the exact same conclusion, 86 demonstrating just how
much leeway the Supreme Court had left for lower courts to
work with. In fact, with regards to how much confusion
precludes the fair use defense, the Ninth Circuit expressly
recognized that the Supreme Court gave lower courts the
authority to determine the relationship between the two. 87 The
circuit court then proceeded to address both the likelihood of
confusion and the fair use defense 88 and found that the jury
should consider likelihood of confusion when addressing the
fairness of the use. 89 Therefore, the court again concluded that
the district court’s granting of KP’s motion for summary
judgment was improper. 90
The Ninth Circuit’s decision creates a great problem for
judicial efficiency. Since a plaintiff must prove some material
issue of fact as to the likelihood of confusion before a defendant
asserts fair use, 91 there will never be an occasion to grant a
defendant summary judgment on a fair use claim under this
approach. In other words, because a plaintiff has, in theory,
already established a genuine issue of material fact as to
confusion by the time a defendant asserts fair use, there will
always be a genuine issue of material fact in a fair use claim.
In another recent case, New York Mercantile Exchange,
Inc. v. Intercontinentalexchange, Inc., 92 the Southern District of
New York was given the opportunity to offer its interpretation
of “classic” fair use after the Supreme Court’s decision in KP
Permanent.
That case involved, among many claims,
85

KP Permanent, 408 F.3d at 609.
Id.
87
Id. at 607 (stating that the issue of how much confusion precludes the fair
use defense “was left for the consideration of the Ninth Circuit in this case”).
88
Id. at 608-09. The court held that “the degree of consumer confusion
remains a factor in evaluating fair use.” Id. at 609.
89
Id. (finding likelihood of confusion “[a]mong the relevant factors for
consideration by the jury in determining the fairness of the use”).
90
Id. Author’s note: The district court has yet to hear this case on remand as
of the writing of this note.
91
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 120 (2004) (stating that “it is only
when a plaintiff has shown likely confusion by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant could have any need of an affirmative defense”).
92
389 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86
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allegations of trademark infringement to which the defendant
asserted the classic fair use defense. 93 New York Mercantile
Exchange (“NYMEX”), a commodities futures exchange,
brought a suit against Intercontinentalexchange (“ICE”), an
online competitor, for ICE’s unauthorized use of NYMEX’s
service marks. 94 NYMEX asserted that ICE could not claim
fair use in the face of confusion, apparently overlooking the
Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent. 95 Oddly enough,
NYMEX had never offered any evidence to allege actual
confusion or even a likelihood of confusion. 96 The court granted
ICE’s motion for summary judgment due to the lack of
confusion, and never reached the merits of the fair use claim. 97
In any event, this opinion still bears some significance on the
state of classic fair use following KP Permanent. While the
Southern District of New York correctly concluded that fair use
could co-exist with confusion, the court seemed to suggest that
if a defendant establishes fair use on the merits, any confusion
is irrelevant. 98
Finally, in Century 21 Real Estate Corporation v.
Lendingtree, Inc., 99 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals offered
its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in KP
Permanent as it relates to nominative fair use. The Third
Circuit adopted an original two-step approach to nominative
fair use cases quite similar to the approach followed in the
“classic” fair use cases. 100 The first step requires the plaintiff to
prove a likelihood of confusion from defendant’s use of the

93

Id. at 529.
Id.
95
Id. at 546 (noting that the cases upon which NYMEX relies
“predate . . . the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent Make-Up”).
96
Id. (recognizing that “NYMEX has not raised any issue of material fact
that a likelihood of confusion exists” and “offered no evidence [of] actual customer
confusion”) (emphasis added).
97
Id.
98
See New York Mercantile Exch., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (stating that
NYMEX’s assertion that fair use cannot exist in the face of confusion is “wrong as a
matter of law”). It is questionable as to how the court would have ruled if faced with
evidence of confusion as it did make sure to point out that no confusion was alleged nor
did any exist. Id. at 546. Nonetheless, the language in this portion of the opinion
suggests that the court had no reservations about upholding a use as fair in the face of
confusion. Id. at 545.
99
425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
100
Id. at 222 (“Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use
cases.”).
94
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mark. 101 Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant
can assert fair use, which the court analyzes under the threepronged nominative fair use test. 102 The dissenting judge in
this case found the majority’s new test to create too heavy a
burden on the defendant, as he would likely bear the burden of
negating confusion. 103 This opinion also found critics amongst
some of intellectual property law’s foremost legal scholars. 104 J.
Thomas McCarthy, author of one of the leading treatises on
trademark law and founder of the McCarthy Institute for
Intellectual Property and Technology Law at the University of
San Francisco School of Law, commented, “I’ve spent many
decades studying trademark law, and this is one of the most
confusing cases I’ve seen . . . .” 105 Since nominative fair use is
entirely judge-made law, these cases provide the sole
framework to such claims and bear great significance. The
Third Circuit, while well-intentioned, may not have put forth
the best approach.
The only other case to address nominative fair use after
the Court’s decision in KP Permanent did not alter the prior
nominative fair use test 106 as defined in the Ninth Circuit. 107
All of these cases following KP Permanent demonstrate the
need for the Court or Congress to clarify the relationship
between confusion and fair use in trademark law.
II.

COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE

Similar to trademark law, courts in copyright cases
have historically protected certain unauthorized but fair uses
of protected material from claims of infringement. 108 Copyright
101
Id. While the plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion, the court
suggested altering the traditional test for likelihood of confusion by eliminating certain
factors of the test “that do not ‘fit’ in the nominative use context.” Id.
102
Id. For the three factors of the nominative fair use test, see New Kids on
the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
103
Century 21, 425 F.3d at 233 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (concluding that the
majority’s test “places on defendant the burden of negating likely confusion”).
104
See G.M. Filisko, Trademark Ruling Creates Confusion, 4-43 ABA
JOURNAL E-REPORT 2 (Oct. 21, 2005).
105
Id.
106
See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., No. 99-C-5565, 2005 WL 464688, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that even after KP Permanent, “[t]he New Kids test
provides sound criteria for assessing when nominative use is fair or unfair, despite a
likelihood of confusion among consumers).
107
See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
108
For what is regarded as, perhaps, the first discussion of a fair use claim in
copyright, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
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law seeks to protect “original works of authorship” such as a
song, a book, or a photograph. 109 The roots of this protection
are well-grounded in United States history, as the Constitution
empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 110 In order for a work to be protected, it must
consist of some amount of originality and creativity. 111
Copyright infringement requires the exact copying of a
protected work or proof of substantial similarity and access to
the copyrighted work. 112
The term “fair use” made its first appearance in a
copyright opinion in 1869, when an author borrowed material
from an earlier publication of a work while scripting a new
edition. 113 For over 100 years, the fair use doctrine existed
entirely in judge-made law. In the mid-1970s, Congress
codified the doctrine of fair use in the Copyright Act of 1976. 114
The Copyright Act permits fair use to operate as an affirmative
defense to a claim of infringement if, after looking at four
statutory factors and balancing their equities, the court deems
the use as fair. 115 The factors to which the court must look are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential
market or value of the copyrighted work. 116 These four factors
are not exclusive and often overlap when courts decide whether
use is fair. Although there is no prescribed formula to
determine fair use, some uses garner a stronger likelihood of
success than others in a fair use claim. 117

In Folsom, an author of a biography on President Washington had borrowed material
from an earlier work, mainly letters written by George Washington himself. Id. at 343.
The court asked “whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials.” Id. at 348.
In determining whether the use was fair, Justice Story looked to “the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work.” Id.
109
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
110
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
111
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
112
Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1995).
113
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
114
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See discussion infra Part II.A and Part II.B.
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Purpose and Character of Use

Under the first factor of the fair use test, courts look at
the purpose and character of the use. 118 Alleged infringing uses
can be divided into two sub-categories: (1) transformative or
non-transformative use; and (2) commercial or non-commercial
use. 119 Courts generally do not extend the fair use doctrine to
commercial, non-transformative uses, because such uses
contain no originality and seek to reap where one has not
On the other hand, if a non-commercial use
sown. 120
significantly transforms a work, courts will generally uphold
the use as fair. 121 A more difficult situation arises when use is
transformative but commercial, or non-transformative but noncommercial, and courts have faced a significantly greater
challenge in determining whether use is fair in these
situations.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (“Acuff-Rose”), the
United States Supreme Court held that although the rap group
2 Live Crew created a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty
Woman” for commercial gain, they had significantly
transformed the song, and therefore, fair use could prevail. 122
The holders of the copyright to the famous Roy Orbison song
had sued 2 Live Crew, alleging infringement, suggesting that
the commercial use of the song constituted a presumptively
unfair use of a copyrighted work. 123 Although the Court of
Appeals concluded that the fair use defense was barred by the
song’s commercial character and excessive borrowing, 124 the
Supreme Court reversed with Justice Stevens writing the
opinion for a unanimous Court. 125

118

17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000) (assessing “whether such use is of a
commercial nature”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(stating that in assessing the purpose of the use, courts should also consider “whether
and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’”).
120
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984) (noting that if an alleged infringer copied a protected work for commercial gain,
“such use would presumptively be unfair”).
121
See Acuff Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that “the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . . that may weigh against a
finding of fair use”).
122
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 594.
123
Id. at 572-74.
124
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev’d by, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
125
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 594.
119
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In analyzing the first factor of the fair use defense,
Justice Stevens drew implicitly upon free speech principles,
ignoring the strong sexual content and illicit language in 2 Live
Crew’s song. 126 Although the lyrics of 2 Live Crew’s song
contained “degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a
sigh of relief from paternal responsibility” which would surely
make the members of the Court cringe, they nonetheless
upheld the use as fair. 127 Warning that “[t]his is not, of course,
to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the
cream and get away scot free,” Justice Stevens rested the
pinnacle of the Court’s holding on the transformative character
of the use, since 2 Live Crew “departed markedly” from the
lyrics in the Roy Orbison classic. 128
In a similarly murky area of the first factor of the fair
use test lies the non-transformative, yet non-commercial use,
such as that in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. (“Sony”), which involved the introduction of the
home videotape recorder in America. 129 In Sony, copyright
holders in the television industry brought a suit against the
Since the
manufacturers of home videotape recorders. 130
purchasers of such devices could use them to record protected
works, the copyright holders opposed the sale of the devices,
alleging infringement, based on the non-transformative use. 131
The Court acknowledged that if consumers used the devices to
make a profit, the fair use defense would not apply. 132 The
Court, however, characterized the use as non-commercial since
most purchasers of the device simply sought to watch their
favorite programs at different times. 133 Arguably, the Court
could have found the use commercial, but chose instead to focus
on the time-shifting, 134 which held no commercial purpose. 135
126
Id. at 582 (stating that “[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does
not and should not matter to fair use”).
127
See id. at 583.
128
Id. at 589 (stating that “2 Live Crew not only copied the first line of the
original, but thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends”).
129
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 420.
132
Id. at 449 (stating that “to make copies for a commercial or profit-making
purpose . . . would presumptively be unfair”).
133
Id. (characterizing “time-shifting for private home use . . . as a
noncommercial, nonprofit activity”).
134
Time-shifting refers to the idea that users of a home video recording device
simply shift the time at which they watch programs. Id. at 421.
135
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
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Both the Court’s decision in Acuff-Rose and Sony
demonstrated the complexity in analyzing fair use claims. The
Court indicated that they would not create any per se rules for
determining whether use is fair. 136 In Acuff-Rose, even a
commercial use could potentially survive a claim of
infringement, 137 while in Sony, a non-transformative use had
equivalent success. 138
B.

The Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Under the second factor of the fair use test, courts
examine the nature of the copyrighted work. 139 Similar to the
first factor, courts divide the copyrighted work into two subcategories: (1) factual or fictional; and (2) published or
unpublished. 140 Use of factual, published works, such as the
news, garners the strongest likelihood of success on a fair use
defense. 141 At the opposite end of the spectrum, use of fictional,
published works typically fails on a fair use defense. 142 The
question of fair use, however, becomes more difficult when the
Court faces factual, yet unpublished accounts.
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
(“Harper & Row”), authors of the soon-to-be-published memoirs
of former President Gerald Ford brought a suit against a
magazine that had published portions of the work after
receiving an illicit copy from an undisclosed source. 143 Although
the District Court rejected the magazine’s fair use claim, the

136
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (declaring
that fair use “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules”); Sony, 464 U.S. at 448
(referring to copyright fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” (citation omitted)).
137
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589.
138
Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
139
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
140
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990) (recognizing the
distinction between factual and fictional works as highly relevant to a fair use
analysis); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)
(noting that whether or not a work is published or unpublished “is a critical element of
its ‘nature’” (citations omitted)).
141
See, e.g., Abend, 495 U.S. at 237 (stating that “fair use is more likely to be
found in factual works than in fictional works”).
142
See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
143-44 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that “the scope of fair use is somewhat narrower with
respect to fictional works”); see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd.,
996 F.2d 1366, 1376 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the second factor “favor[s] . . . creative
and fictional work[s]”).
143
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
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Second Circuit upheld the use as fair. 144 Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the Second
Circuit. 145 In analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work,
Justice O’Connor recognized the additional concerns when
considering a fair use claim dealing with unpublished works. 146
In doing so, she acknowledged the value in the exclusive rights
a publisher may have prior to publication. 147 Ultimately, the
Court found that the magazine’s unauthorized and
“clandestine” use infringed the copyright owner’s interests so
much that the Court could not characterize the use as fair. 148
Again, the Court in Harper & Row seemed to focus on
the freedom of expression values inherent in copyright law. 149
While the magazine had the right to publish material, such
slavish copying was impermissible. 150 In addition, since the
original work had yet to be published, the Court implicitly
recognized the authors’ freedom of expression rights and the
infringement that occurs when one “free-rides” on another’s
original work. 151

144
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d
Cir. 1983), rev’d by, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
145
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
146
Id. at 564 (stating that “the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works”).
147
Id. (noting the importance of “[t]he right of first publication” and “the
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”).
148
Id. (denying the fair use defense since the use “so clearly infringes the
copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control”).
149
For an example of the freedom of expression values found inherent in the
fair use defense to copyright infringement, see Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that “[c]onflicts between
interests protected by the first amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been
resolved by application of the fair use doctrine”). The Wainwright court went on
further to state that “[w]hat is protected is the manner of expression, the author’s
analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments.” Id at
95-96. See also Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that “First Amendment considerations are relevant in determining whether
the purpose of copying a work and the nature of the work copied militate in favor of
finding a given use of a particular work to be a ‘fair use’”).
150
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (stating that “the fact that a substantial
portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value
of the copied material”).
151
Id. (criticizing “the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone
else’s copyrighted expression”).
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Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

The third factor of the fair use defense to copyright
infringement requires the court to analyze the amount and
substantiality of the portion used. 152 While again, there are no
per se rules as to what constitutes too much copying, the courts
generally view this factor as heavily related to the purpose and
character of the use. 153 The analysis under the third factor
differs amongst parodies, books, and other areas in which one
asserts a fair use defense. 154 Even the reproduction of an entire
work will not preclude a fair use defense in some situations,
such as the time-shifting in Sony. 155 Similarly, courts might
permit substantial quotations in a book review or a newscast
recapping a speech, but not in an exclusive, yet-to-be published
work. 156
In parody, the third factor also implicates the fourth
factor, 157 since the borrowing inherent in parody may affect the
market or value of the copyrighted work. 158 The Court in AcuffRose recognized the difficulty posed by parody, because parody
must remind the listener or reader of the original in order to
succeed. 159 Therefore, although a successful parody appears to
patently fail the third factor of the test, if one “depart[s]
markedly” and adds other “distinctive sounds,” a court may
characterize a parody as a fair use. 160

152

17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994)
(stating that in analyzing the third factor, “attention turns to the persuasiveness of a
parodist’s justification for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will harken
back to the first of the statutory factors, for . . . the extent of permissible copying varies
with the purpose and character of the use”).
154
See id. (analyzing the third factor in parody by “turn[ing] to the
persuasiveness of a parodist’s justification for the particular copying done). But cf.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66 (analyzing the third factor in both qualitative and
quantitative terms in the publishing context).
155
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984) (noting that the full reproduction of protected works “does not . . . militat[e]
against a finding of fair use” when involving non-commercial use).
156
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (noting that “substantial quotations might
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech”).
157
For a greater discussion of the fourth factor, see discussion infra Part II.D.
158
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587 (stating that the third factor “reveal[s] the
degree to which the parody may serve as a market substitute for the original or
potentially licensed derivatives”).
159
Id. at 588 (stating that “[p]arody’s humor . . . springs from recognizable
allusion to its object through distorted imitation”).
160
Id. at 589.
153
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The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market or Value of
the Copyrighted Work

The final factor of the fair use test in copyright law
analyzes the effect of the use on the potential market or value
of the copyrighted work. 161 Traditionally, courts have placed
the greatest weight on the fourth factor. 162 Courts typically
limit fair use to copying which does not significantly affect the
market of the copied work. 163 According to the Second Circuit,
this fourth factor should strike a balance between the benefits
to the public in permitting the use and the personal gains the
copyright owner may receive in denying the use. 164 Generally,
if an alleged infringing use significantly impacts or “corners”
the market, the use will fail the fourth factor. 165
The facts of Harper & Row offered the Court an ideal
opportunity to illustrate a use that fails the fourth factor. 166
Following Nation Enterprise’s unauthorized use of Gerald
Ford’s soon-to-be published memoirs, Time magazine cancelled
its exclusive deal with the publishers and refused to pay the
$12,500 to which the two parties had already agreed upon. 167
Presented with this evidence of the direct effect the infringing
use had on the market, the Court stated, “[r]arely will a case of
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of

161

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.05[A][4] (2005) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (stating that the fourth factor
often “emerges as the most important, and indeed, central” factor in fair use cases
(citations omitted)).
163
1 id. § 1.10[D] (stating that fair use is limited to “copying by others that
does not materially impair the marketability of the work that is copied” (citations
omitted)).
164
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). The MCA court also
noted that “[t]he less adverse effect that an alleged infringing use has on the copyright
owner’s expectation of gain, the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.”
Id.
165
See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 621
F.2d 57, 62 (1980) (finding with respect to the fourth factor that “ABC did foreclose a
significant potential market . . . monopolized that market . . . [and] usurped an
extremely significant market”).
166
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567
(1985).
167
Id.
162
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actual damage.” 168 In denying Nation Enterprise’s fair use
defense, the Court relied heavily on this fourth factor. 169
Although the fair use doctrine requires courts to
examine all four factors of the test, courts often imply the
potentially dispositive effect of the fourth and final factor,
irrespective of the results of the other portions of the test. 170
Courts, however, must still rule on a case-by-case basis and
consider all factors. 171 In copyright cases, this test gives courts
significant guidance to address fair use claims in various
contexts.
Trademark law would benefit from similar
articulation by the courts.
III.

WHY TRADEMARK LAW CAN BORROW FROM COPYRIGHT
LAW

There are distinct differences between what copyright
and trademark law actually protect. 172 Similar motivations
behind the desire to protect both, however, justify the idea that
trademark law can borrow from copyright law. Not only does
protection of both of these types of intellectual property seek to
curb free-riding, 173 but it also creates economic incentives. 174 In
addition, protection attempts to balance the competing public
interests in fostering competition with the private interests in
168

Id.
See id. at 569 (stating that “a fair use doctrine that permits extensive
prepublication quotations from an unreleased manuscript . . . poses substantial
potential for damage to the marketability of first serialization rights in general”).
170
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984) (stating that in the non-commercial context, fair use will fail if a copyright
holder demonstrates that the use “would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work”).
171
See, e.g., Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1110-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fair use defense failed even though the fourth factor favored the
defendant); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (while
suggesting fair use on the first three factors, the Court remanded to allow the hole in
the evidence with respect to the fourth factor to “be plugged on remand”).
172
Copyright protects the more tangible rights in music, books, and works of
art. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Trademark, in contrast, protects the intangible
right of goodwill associated with a trademark owner’s product or service. See 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2.
173
See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should
the Close Association Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 90 (1989) (stating that
intellectual property law is “intended to increase the creative and distributional
efficiency of market participants”).
174
See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(protecting trademarks “encourages producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with
a particular mark”); Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 179, 180 (1995) (protecting copyrights “create[s] economic incentives for
creativity”).
169
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protecting an individual’s property rights. 175 For example, if an
individual is granted no protection for a copyright or a
trademark, anyone can simply copy an artistic creation or
source-identifying word or symbol and share in the success of
its creator or owner. To avoid this free-riding, copyright and
trademark law grant certain protections to owners of
intellectual property. This, in turn, helps create economic
The law, however, moves
incentives to these owners. 176
cautiously not to over-protect these property rights, because
this could inhibit competition or freedom of expression. 177
Therefore, these protections are not limitless.
By creating the doctrine of fair use, both copyright and
trademark law limit their protections to help safeguard other
important societal values. 178 Both doctrines of fair use are
heavily intertwined with the First Amendment’s protection of
free speech. 179 Additionally, just as protecting intellectual
property creates market incentives, 180 limiting protection has a
similar economic rationale. 181 In copyright law, a significant
part of the fair use defense requires courts to examine the
effect the alleged infringing use may have on the potential

175

See ZOE HILDEN & BRIAN T. JAENICKE, FAIR USE OF TRADEMARKS: A LOOK
KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP, INC. V. LASTING IMPRESSION I, INC. AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, at 3 (2005) (noting
that protecting intellectual property often creates “a struggle between competing public
interests – namely, consumer protection and incentives to social progress versus
competition and the free flow of information – as well as competing private interests –
namely, property rights versus individual free expression”).
176
See supra note 174.
177
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Corp., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that “[o]verprotection stifles the very creative
forces [intellectual property is] supposed to nurture” (citations omitted)); see also
HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 1 (recognizing that “intellectual property rights
[are] an obstacle to free competition [and] a hindrance to the free flow of information
and ideas in the public domain as well as to the individual right to free expression”).
178
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
179
See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications
of the Emerging Rationale for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158,
207 (1982) (noting that “extensions of the trademark monopoly must be tempered by
the realization that unlimited control over the use of trade symbols will at times
interfere with the exercise of basic first amendment rights”); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1987) (arguing that fair use is
“the most important and far reaching” free speech constraint on copyright protection).
180
See supra note 174.
181
See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (arguing that the Supreme Court stresses
economic incentives when assessing fair use in copyright); see also HILDEN & JAENICKE,
supra note 175, at 7 (recognizing that Congress codified the concept of ‘classic fair use’
“[a]s a means of avoiding the danger that commonplace phrases might be adopted as
marks and become the exclusive property of private owners”).
AT THE
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market or value of the copyrighted work. 182 Likewise, in
trademark law, fair use allows competitors to use trademarks
in good faith in their true descriptive sense to avoid monopolies
on descriptive words which inhibit free competition. 183
This section will further explain the rationales behind
intellectual property protection and fair use in order to justify
incorporating principles of copyright’s fair use test into the
realm of trademark fair use. The last part of this section will
be devoted to the idea that trademarks, while designed to
identify source, have begun to do work they were not originally
meant to do. 184 For example, while at one time, a trademark
was stitched on the inside of a shirt collar, trademarks are now
often found as a part of the shirt itself, such as the Lacoste
crocodile, 185 and consumers desire a visible trademark as a sign
of status or style. 186 Although trademarks have traditionally
been considered a quasi-property right, and not a tangible
property right such as a copyright, these shifts might warrant
reconsideration of the protections of trademark law. 187
A.

Why Does the Law Protect Copyrights and Trademarks?

The protection of copyrights and trademarks serves
three main purposes: (1) to prohibit free-riding; 188 (2) to create
economic incentives; 189 and (3) to balance the competing public

182

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (stating that effect on the potential market is
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”).
183
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
184
See generally, Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
960 (1993).
185
Most people immediately recognize a Lacoste shirt by the crocodile which
adorns the outside of the item. For further illustrations, see the Lacoste website,
http://www.lacoste.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
186
See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 961 (recognizing the “growing tendency to
use trademarks . . . to enhance or adorn [products], even to create new commodities
altogether”).
187
Id. at 966 (arguing that this change should be confronted by amending the
Lanham Act).
188
See Burgunder, supra note 173, at 90 (stating that intellectual property
law is “intended to increase the creative and distributional efficiency of market
participants”).
189
See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(protecting trademarks “encourages producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with
a particular mark”); see also Thau, supra note 174, at 180 (protecting copyrights
“create[s] economic incentives for creativity”).

2006]

FAIR USE IN THE POST-KP PERMANENT WORLD

1691

and private interests inherent in both. 190 In 1946, Congress
enacted the Lanham Act 191 “to secure to the owner of [a
trademark] the goodwill of his business and to protect the
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing
producers.” 192 Although state protections existed previously, 193
Congress felt that national protection was warranted to foster
competition and ensure product quality by securing trademark
holders with the benefits of a good reputation. 194 At the most
basic level, these protections discouraged free-riders. 195
Without these protections, individuals could capitalize on their
competitors’ previously established goodwill. For example, if a
particular brand of shirt became popular, a competitor could
simply attach that name to his shirts and instantly create a
market for his goods. These protections also created an
economic incentive for a trademark owner to establish a strong
trade reputation and economic efficiency for consumers who
can easily identify quality through the use of trademarks. 196
Trademark law, however, must avoid overprotection which
might limit freedom of speech or hinder competition. 197
Generally speaking, the law disfavors monopolies, and if
protection is absolute, competition or free speech can suffer. 198

190

See HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 3 (noting that protecting
intellectual property often creates “a struggle between competing public interests –
namely, consumer protection and incentives to social progress versus competition and
the free flow of information – as well as competing private interests – namely, property
rights versus individual free expression”).
191
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000).
192
Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.,
at 3, 5 (1946)).
193
See Federal Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724 (trademark protection
was a matter of state concern governed by the common law).
194
Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.,
at 4 (1946)).
195
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:1 (stating that trademark is, in part,
based on “the plaintiff’s interest in not having the fruit of his labor misappropriated”).
196
See Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (protecting a trademark “encourages
producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with a particular mark”); see also
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (concluding that “trademark law . . . can best be
explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency”).
197
See supra note 190; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:1 (noting that
trademark protection “has traditionally been a battleground for competing policies”).
198
See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (stating that “[o]ne who seeks to register (or protect) a product or
container configuration as a trademark must demonstrate that its design is
‘nonfunctional’”); see also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group,
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (construing the Lanham Act narrowly when the First
Amendment is implicated).
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Although copyright law protects a different type of
property, namely creative works such as songs or books, 199 the
principles behind protection are not all that different from
those of trademark law. Copyright law also seeks to curb freeriding “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 200 In doing so, copyright law creates strong
economic incentives to create original works by granting
authors a bundle of rights. 201 Again, similar to trademark law,
copyright law’s protections are not limitless and sometimes
yield to the protections of the First Amendment. 202
B.

Why Does the Law Limit Copyright and Trademark
Protection by Fair Use?

Both copyright and trademark law limit protections
through their respective doctrines of fair use. 203 In permitting
some unauthorized, but fair uses, both areas of intellectual
property law use similar economic efficiency 204 and free speech
rationales 205 to justify borrowing. In trademark law, when a
court determines that an alleged infringing use is fair, they
are, in essence, telling the mark owner that this infringement
will not cause unwarranted confusion and that barring the use
would foster unfair competition and hinder free speech. 206
Similarly, in copyright law, when a court determines that an
alleged infringing use is fair, they are telling the copyright
holder that the use furthers innovation as it does not intrude

199

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000) (granting copyright holders the right to
reproduce their works, to prepare derivative works, and to distribute copies).
202
See Patterson, supra note 179, at 4 (arguing that “the copyright clause
limits the power of Congress to grant copyright because it embodies free speech
constraints”).
203
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
204
See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (arguing that the Supreme Court stresses
economic incentives when assessing fair use in copyright); see also HILDEN & JAENICKE,
supra note 175, at 7 (noting that Congress codified the concept of ‘classic fair use’ “[a]s
a means of avoiding the danger that commonplace phrases might be adopted as marks
and become the exclusive property of private owners”).
205
See Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (noting that “extensions of the
trademark monopoly must be tempered by the realization that unlimited control over
the use of trade symbols will at times interfere with the exercise of basic first
amendment rights”); Patterson, supra note 179, at 36 (arguing that fair use is “the
most important and far reaching” free speech constraint on copyright protection).
206
See discussion infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
200
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too far into the original work and that barring the use would
again hinder free speech and have adverse economic effects. 207
In permitting fair use of another’s trademark, the
Lanham Act seeks to prohibit a trademark owner from having
the exclusive right in a descriptive term which others may use
to describe their goods. 208 The Supreme Court has long since
acknowledged that an “absolute prohibition” against using
another’s
trademark
would
result
in
undesirable
209
The statutory fair use defense recognizes
overprotection.
that the public should retain rights in the use of language. 210
The law seeks to carefully balance the monopoly created by
trademark protection with the protections of the First
Amendment. 211
That is not to say, however, that the protections of the
First Amendment alone justify a fair use defense. 212 While
trademark fair use certainly intertwines freedom of speech
concerns, a trademark owner’s rights need not always cease at
the door of the First Amendment. 213 On the other hand, certain
situations in trademark law directly implicate the First
Amendment. 214 It is behind these driving principles that fair
use in trademark exists.
Fair use in copyright was derived upon similar
principles, although its history runs much deeper. Upon
drafting § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress

207

See discussion infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
that fair use “forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term for his
exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their
goods”).
209
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall’s Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554, 559 (1908)
(noting that such a restriction “would carry trademarks too far”).
210
Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park And Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that “[l]anguage, even in a commercial context,
properly belongs to the public” (citations omitted)).
211
Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (stating that “extensions of the trademark
monopoly must be tempered by the realization that unlimited control over the use of
trade symbols will at times interfere with the exercise of basic first amendment
rights”).
212
See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating that “the protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give [an alleged
infringer] license to infringe [trademark] rights”).
213
Id. (explaining that trademark rights need not “yield to the exercise of
First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist” (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972))).
214
Denicola, supra note 179, at 207 (stating that “[w]hen the trademark is
utilized as a vehicle for the communication of ideas . . . constitutional interests can no
longer be ignored”).
208
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recognized the judicial doctrine of fair use as “one of the most
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive
right of copyright owners” and “an equitable rule of reason.” 215
Courts have acknowledged this principle since as early as the
nineteenth century when Justice Story declared that “[e]very
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and
used before.” 216 In codifying these longstanding principles,
Congress effectively protected an individual’s rights to free
expression with limitations.
The Supreme Court, in its application of the fair use
test, has often evoked principles of free speech. 217 Under the
first factor of the fair use test, 218 courts are typically more likely
to protect transformative uses, which both foster creativity
while at the same time protect free speech. 219 As the Court has
recently noted, copyright law must balance the different
interests at stake such as promoting creativity while still
protecting copyright holders’ rights. 220
Copyright fair use also examines the market effects
infringement may have, 221 as the fourth factor of the test
requires courts to look at the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 222 The
first and second factors of the test also implicate these
concerns. 223 The analysis of the purpose and character of the
use looks at whether a use is commercial or non-commercial, 224

215
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5678-79.
216
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
217
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (declaring
that “[w]hether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair
use”).
218
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
219
See discussion supra Part II.A.
220
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2775 (2005) (describing copyright claims as “an exercise in managing the trade-off”
between “the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright
protection and promoting innovation . . . by limiting the incidence of liability for
copyright infringement”).
221
See Thau, supra note 174, at 186 (suggesting that many of the Supreme
Court’s recent copyright decisions involving fair use “turned on the role that fair use
would play in copyright’s scheme of economic incentives”).
222
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
223
See id. § 107(1)-(2).
224
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984) (stating that “to make copies for a commercial or profit-making
purpose . . . would presumptively be unfair”).
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and the nature of the copyrighted work considers whether the
work is published or unpublished. 225
Similar to the goals of trademark fair use, copyright fair
use balances the interests at stake to determine when
infringement is improper. 226 Therefore, it would make sense to
examine copyright law when considering how to better analyze
trademark fair use claims.
C.

The Expansion of Trademarks Beyond Source
Identification

Traditionally, trademarks serve primarily sourceidentifying functions. 227 More recently, however, societal trends
have altered the landscape of trademark usage and provided an
additional reason for reconsidering the limitations on
trademark protection. 228 In today’s society, trademarks not
only indicate source, but are also a desirable part of the
product itself. 229 For example, some consumers purchase
clothing, hats, and bumper stickers to show allegiance to a
particular sports team, and the team’s trademark is not a
source-identifier at all. 230 Trademarks can also represent
status or fashion.
Many clothing companies put their
trademarks in highly visible places as a selling point for their
merchandise. For example, Tommy Hilfiger emblazons their
trademark on the outside of almost every item of clothing they
sell. The trademark can even become the product itself, such
as a rapper wearing a gold Mercedes-Benz hood ornament
around his neck. Online retailers sometimes use a competitor’s
trademark to generate search engine results or even to trigger

225

See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985) (acknowledging the value in “[t]he right of first publication” and “the choices of
when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”).
226
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2775 (2005).
227
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 3:2.
228
See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 962-63 (arguing that these new trends
“raise[] questions about whether – and to what extent – the law should protect
trademarks”).
229
See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 961 (recognizing the “growing tendency to
use trademarks . . . to enhance or adorn [products], even to create new commodities
altogether”).
230
When one buys a New York Yankees t-shirt from a vendor in the parking
lot at Yankee stadium, it is highly doubtful that he thinks the New York Yankees
organization endorses this sale.
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pop-up advertisements. 231 As the role of trademarks expands,
the law should consider what, of these new roles, trademark
legislation should protect, and how to effectuate any potential
changes. In the realm of fair use, trademark will benefit by
expanding the current test and incorporating analogous
aspects of copyright fair use and its considerably more
comprehensive test.
IV.

INCORPORATING COPYRIGHT FAIR USE INTO TRADEMARK
FAIR USE

Given the changing landscape of trademarks 232 as well
as the confusion following the Supreme Court’s take on fair use
in KP Permanent, 233 courts must facilitate a better approach to
assessing trademark fair use. Due to the similarities to
copyright law, trademark law would benefit from looking to
copyright’s fair use test, which courts have applied more
consistently. Copyright fair use applies a significantly more
comprehensive test to ascertain whether or not a use is fair. 234
If the factors of that test are analogized to the areas of
trademark law which they most resemble, trademark law, too,
will have similar consistency in the courts. While a copyright
fair use claim involves a careful analysis of the original work,
the alleged infringing use, and the market effects, 235 the
Lanham Act only requires an analysis of the alleged infringing
use to determine if the use is fair. 236 In KP Permanent, the
Court suggested that if the alleged infringing use met the
elements of the fair use defense, the defense could succeed even
when there is consumer confusion. 237 Although the Court
indicated that some level of confusion might defeat the fair use
231
See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that a search engine’s use of a trademark to trigger advertising does not
qualify as “use” of the mark under Lanham Act); but cf. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v.
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (reaching the opposite
conclusion).
232
See discussion supra Part III.C.
233
See discussion supra Part I.E.
234
In addition to the four factor test, the Court has also noted that additional
factors can be considered. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the four statutory factors “are not
necessarily the exclusive determinants of the fair use inquiry and do not
mechanistically resolve fair use issues”).
235
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
236
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
237
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
121 (2004).
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defense, they gave no suggestion as to how lower courts can
come to this conclusion. 238 By failing to give any guidance, the
Court ignored one of the pinnacle justifications behind
trademark protection: avoiding marketplace confusion. 239
In “classic” fair use claims, courts should consider more
than just the nature of the alleged infringing use to better
determine how much confusion would bar the defense. As it
currently stands, the Lanham Act only requires that courts
determine if the trademark is used descriptively, not as a
trademark, fairly, and in good faith. 240 In reviewing these
considerations, courts, in actuality, only assess the alleged
infringer’s conduct and use. 241 This is similar to the first factor
of copyright fair use, which looks at the purpose and character
of the use. 242 One can only imagine what would become of
copyright fair use if it only considered the first factor of the
four factor test required by statute. 243
Trademark law also touches on the third factor of the
copyright test which assesses the amount and substantiality of
the portion used. 244 What the trademark test fails to consider,
however, is a trademark owner’s rights, his use of the
trademark, and how the alleged infringing use may affect the
market. One of the most important considerations in copyright
fair use is the fourth factor of the test which assesses the
potential economic effects of the alleged infringing use. 245 In
fact, both copyright and trademark fair use were constructed
around goals of economic efficiency. 246 Without reviewing the
trademark itself, its owner’s rights, and the economic effects in
permitting or denying a defendant’s alleged infringing use,
courts will ignore the primary concerns in creating the fair use
defense in the first place.
Courts hearing trademark cases should consider both
parties’ use of the trademark as well as the respective markets
238

Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
240
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
241
See id. The considerations of the Lanham Act address only how the alleged
infringer uses the trademark.
242
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
243
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
244
See id. § 107(3).
245
See id. § 107(4); see also 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 162,
§ 13.05[A][4] (stating that the fourth factor often “emerges as the most important, and
indeed, central” factor in fair use cases (citations omitted)).
246
See discussion supra Part III.B.
239
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in which they sell their products, just as courts hearing
copyright cases consider the nature of the copyrighted work as
well as economic effects in permitting or denying fair use. In
looking at the plaintiff’s use of the trademark, the analysis
should not be all that different from a typical likelihood of
confusion analysis. 247 Courts, however, should reexamine the
likelihood of confusion in light of the fair use claim which may
alter their conclusions. Courts can look at the strength of the
plaintiff’s trademark as well as when it was registered
juxtaposed to the defendant’s use of the trademark. A plaintiff
who has had its trademark federally registered and in use for
over ten years before a defendant incorporated the words into
its advertisement should find itself in a much better position
than a plaintiff who has just recently registered a trademark
years after a defendant began using the words to market its
product. 248 These two different scenarios would create entirely
different economic effects, and if trademark fair use is based, in
part, around such concerns, these types of facts must be
considered. Economic effects cannot be properly addressed by
simply analyzing a defendant’s use and bad faith. Copyright
law reviews the plaintiff’s work, and in doing so, properly
addresses economic issues. There is no reason trademark law
should not follow that model for success.
Trademark law could also subdivide the factors of its
test to achieve more equitable results. In copyright law,
certain uses will garner a stronger likelihood of success, such
as transformative, non-commercial uses. 249 In trademark law,
the Lanham Act does consider the transformative nature of the
use by considering whether the alleged infringer uses the
trademark descriptively and not as a trademark. 250 The
statute, however, does not require that courts assess whether
the use is commercial or non-commercial. 251 Trademark law
can incorporate this inquiry by examining the relatedness of
the goods or services between plaintiffs and defendants.
Although courts hearing trademark cases already consider this
factor when evaluating the likelihood of confusion, they should
247

See supra note 32.
The latter situation is not all that different from the facts of KP
Permanent, in which KP had used the words prior to Lasting Impression’s registration.
See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114
(2004).
249
See discussion supra Part II.A.
250
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
251
See id.
248
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revisit the issue when assessing fair use. For example, a
defendant may use another’s trademark in the sale of goods,
which is unquestionably a commercial use. If the defendant
sells breakfast cereal, however, and the plaintiff manufactures
automobiles, the use might not be considered commercial as it
relates to the plaintiff’s business. This additional consideration
will speak to economic repercussions as well, since an
automobile manufacturer can hardly claim that a cereal maker
has adversely affected his business. Similar to copyright law,
this additional consideration is not dispositive but simply
assists courts in evaluating fair use claims.
The dilution of trademarks should also be considered in
the post-KP Permanent world as it applies to fair use. 252
Dilution occurs when a famous mark is misappropriated in a
way that causes it to lose its distinctive value in the
marketplace. 253 Since the Lanham Act requires a distinctive
trademark as opposed to a descriptive one to generate a claim
of dilution, 254 dilution is not applicable to statutory fair use, but
often appears in nominative fair use claims. Some judges have
already begun to blend copyright law with trademark law in
dilution claims to achieve more equitable results. 255 When
Mattel, makers of Barbie, brought a suit against the record
companies who produced, marketed, and sold Barbie Girl, a
song which poked fun at Barbie, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s use under the
nominative fair use doctrine, but in doing so, cited to a
Perhaps Judge Kozinski’s opinion
copyright case. 256
foreshadows the future of fair use in trademark law. In the
area of nominative fair use, particularly parody, courts must
look outside trademark law to find answers. A trademark in
parody does not identify source at all, but rather calls the
consumer’s attention to the parody through the use of a
trademark. 257 Since copyright fair use has successfully and
252
See HILDEN & JAENICKE, supra note 175, at 22 (recognizing that “[i]t
remains to be seen what diluting uses will nonetheless be deemed to be fair in the
name of fostering free expression”).
253
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
254
Id.
255
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
256
See id. at 901 (stating that “[t]he song does not rely on the Barbie mark to
poke fun at another subject but targets Barbie herself”) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) and Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997)).
257
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that “the keystone of parody is imitation”).
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consistently addressed parody, 258 those cases can provide courts
hearing trademark cases with guidance when handling
nominative fair use claims. 259
V.

CONCLUSION

Although
some
readers
might
criticize
this
“incorporation,” this Note does not purport to suggest a
merging of copyright and trademark law but rather a
consideration of copyright fair use to better facilitate consistent
applications of fair use in trademark. The Supreme Court has
already rejected a merging of the two areas of intellectual
property, 260 but the type of incorporation proposed in this Note
is of an entirely different nature. The suggestions of this Note
are highly significant in assessing fair use in trademark and
upholding the general policies behind intellectual property
protection. Although some of this Note’s proposed fair use
factors must be proven by the plaintiff, that does not mean that
they are not relevant to a court’s inquiry into a fair use claim.
Trademark law is based upon multiple policy concerns, and in
order to properly address both traditional and new issues that
arise with respect to trademark infringement, courts must
balance all the interests at stake. 261 As copyright law has
similar interests at stake, 262 the adoption of the analogous
factors from copyright fair use into trademark law is a natural
progression which will benefit the courts as well as both
present and future litigants.
Both copyright and trademark law have recognized
infringing yet fair uses for years, but there are distinct
differences in how the courts have interpreted these two
doctrines of fair use. Copyright fair use requires a thorough
analysis and considers both the original and infringing work as
well as the economic repercussions. The trademark test for fair
258

See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 569.
See generally Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the Copyright
Decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 210-11
(1996).
260
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
In Dastar, the plaintiff tried to use the Lanham Act to grant relief in what was
essentially a copyright claim, but the work was in the public domain, and no longer
protected by a copyright. Id. at 31. The Court denied the plaintiff’s attempt at relief.
Id. at 38.
261
See Kozinski, supra note 184, at 977 (properly analyzing trademark rights
“requir[es] one to balance interests that point in different directions”).
262
See discussion supra Part III.
259
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use involves a much simpler inquiry focusing only on the
infringing use. Copyright protection, however, has deeper
historical roots than trademark, and courts have had more
experience in handling copyright fair use claims. As technology
blossoms and trademarks flourish, predictability in litigation
becomes a necessity to business owners. The state of the law
will affect business owners not just in litigation but also in
their selection and use of trademarks. Trademark law as it
currently stands does not delineate the factors of a fair use
claim clearly enough to aid potential litigants. Since both
copyright and trademark law share similar goals, it would
follow naturally to allow trademark fair use claims to borrow
from the principles of copyright fair use and create a clearer,
more efficient test. Without better guidelines, both the courts
and potential litigants will be wary of how to proceed. By
incorporating principles of fair use in copyright, trademark can
achieve its ultimate goal of avoiding confusion both in the
marketplace as well as within the judicial system.
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